Abstract-The pricing mechanism of cloud-computing resources is an essential issue for both cloud customers and service providers, 5 especially from the point of multi-provider competition. Although various mechanisms for resource provision are proposed, few studies 6 have focused on multi-attribute resource provision with the objective of improving benefits of both cloud customers and service 7 providers. To address the issue, we propose a price bidding mechanism for multi-attribute cloud-computing resource provision from the 8 perspective of a non-cooperative game, in which the information of each player (customers and providers) is incomplete to others and 9 each player wishes to maximize his/her own benefit. More specifically, considering the fairness pricing competition, we propose a novel 10 and incentive resource provision model referring to the Quality-of-Service (QoS) and the bidding price. Then, combining with the 11 resource provision model, the problem of price bidding is formulated as a game to find a proper price for each cloud provider. We 12 demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibrium solution set for the formulated game model by assuming that the quantity function of 13 provided resources from every provider is continuous. To find a Nash equilibrium solution, we propose an Equilibrium Solution Iterative 14 (ESI) algorithm, which is proved to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, a Near-equalization Price Bidding (NPB) algorithm is with the state-of-the-art and benchmark solutions validate and show the feasibility of the proposed method.
In this paper, we focus on the price bidding mechanism for 91 cloud providers resource provision competition from the 92 perspective of non-cooperative game. Our main contribu-93 tions are listed as follows: 94 With the perspective of non-cooperative game, a 95 mechanism of pricing strategy for resource provision 96 is constructed to maximize the profits of both the 97 cloud customers and service providers. 98 Regarding the quantity of the resource provision 99 from each provider as a fraction to get continuous 100 benefit functions, we prove the existence of Nash 101 equilibrium solution for the proposed game model. 102 An ESI algorithm is proposed to compute the Nash 
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Based on the condition uðb b Ài Þ uðb i ; b b Ài ; q i Þ, we obtain: 
price bidding game is used to represent G, where
440
G ¼ fP; Q; C; ug. We have the following definition. we can know C i is a continuous function on P i . The C i is 477 expanded to obtain:
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Taking a derivative with respect to p i yields:
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Taking the second derivative with respect to p i obtains: Eq. (14) is written:
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We observe p i as a continuous function of p j ðj 2 JnfigÞ.
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Taking the derivative of H j with respect to p j , we get 
EXPERIMENTS
669
Related models are compared with our proposed ESI and 670 NPB algorithms from some properties in In the following simulation experiments, the number of 707 cloud providers is varied in the range of 10 to 100. Table 4   708 lists the entire system parameters and the corresponding rithms. The parameters are outlined in Table 5 . The experi- a certain number of iteration. In Fig. 8 , it is shown that the 
